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The research reported in this paper is the result of an effort directed at 
understanding the causes of human error in complex systems. First, a conceptual 
framework is provided, in which two broad categories of error are discussed: errors of 
action, or slips, and errors of intention, or mistakes. Conditions in which slips and 
mistakes might be expected to occur are identified, based on existing theories of human 
error. Regarding the role of workload, it is hypothesized that workload may act as a 
catalyst for error. 
Two experiments are presented in which humans' responses to "error-likely" 
situations were examined. Subjects controlled PLANT under a variety of conditions and 
periodically provided subjective ratings of mental effort. A complex pattern of results was 
obtained, which was not consistent wth predictions. Generally, the results of this research 
indicate that 1) humans respond to conditions in which errors might be expected by 
attempting to reduce the possibility of error, and 2) adaptation to conditions is a potent 
influence upon human behavior in discretionary situations. Subjects' explanations for 
changes in effort ratings are also explored. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When an engineering system fails to perform its function successfully, there is often 
an investigation (formal or informal) to determine the reasons for the system failure. This 
is especially the case when the system failure leads to disastrous consequences. 
partially t e result of "human error." This conclusion was reached after the explosion at 
Flixborou h, the crash of Eastern Air Lines flight 401, and the incidents at Three Mile 
The potentially catastrophic consequences of human error have prompted 
researchers and practitioners to devote considerable effort to identifying ways to deal with 
the problem. One such approach which has gained some popularity is to consider the 
human as another component in the system. As with other system components, humans 
have "failure rates," which denote probabilities that errors will be made when interacting 
with other system components. The likelihood of system failure is determined by 
identifying the probability of failure of each system component (including the human), 
and combining the probabilities (Swain and Guttmann, 1980). Should the overall system 
failure rate be too great, a variety of steps may be taken to reduce the overall rate, such 
as by incorporating redundancy into the system. 
A variety of criticisms have been leveled at this probabilistic approach to dealing 
with human error, particularly when the errors of interest involve "higher level" activities 
such as decision makin and problem solving (e.g., Sheridan, 1980). For example, data on 
availability of error rate data is that it is often difficult to determine what constitutes an 
error. It is also extremely difficult to identify an appropriate denominator for estimating a 
"rate." Further, it has been argued that the way in which rules for combining 
probabilities/rates are typically used may be inappropriate, since human errors are often 
not independent. Finally, even though an error may be made, humans tend to be self- 
correcting; thus, although an error may occur, the consequences of the error may be 
averted. 
, the result of such investigations is the conclusion that the failure was at least 
Island an G! Chernobyl. 
human error rates are B requently unavailable. One aspect of human error hampering the 
In contrast to the above probabilistic approach, this report describes research 
which was conducted for the purpose of learmng more about the causes of human error. It 
is hoped that greater understanding of the contributing factors will provide insights into 
ways to deal with the problem of human error. The conceptual framework upon which the 
work is based is presented first, followed by a discussion of the experimental approach 
and data obtained. Finally, the resulting insights into human behavior are discussed, and 
the implications for research and applications are noted. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
An examination of available literature on human error reveals that most writers 
distinguish between at least two types of error. One common distinction is between errors 
of action (frequently discussed as "slips") and errors of intention ("mistakes"). A slip occurs 
when an intention is not executed as planned (e.g., an automobile driver turning on the 
windshield wipers instead of turning on the lights as intended). A mistake is the result of 
an inappropriate choice of intention (e.g., the hapless driver, stranded due to a lack of 
fuel, might seek to rectify the situation by replacing the battery). 
Of the two types of error noted, more has been written concerning slips. The 
following discussion of slips and mistakes is based upon the work of Reason (1983; 
Reason and Mycielska, 1982), although Norman (1981) presented a discussion of slips that 
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is conce tually similar. These authors have provided rather detailed conce tualizations to 
work for further details. They are not discussed in depth here because the primary 
concern of the present research is with the implications of these models. 
explain K ow slips and mistakes might arise, and the interested reader is re P erred to their 
Characteristics of Slips 
Relying rimarily on information about errors recorded in diaries, Reason and 
Slips occur during the largely automatic execution of some well-established or 
routine sequence of actions.. . . 
Slips appear to be associated with distraction or preoccupation. . . . 
Mycielska (198 f , p. 21) discussed three general characteristics of slips: 
1. 
2. 
3. [Slips appear] to flourish in relatively familiar environments where there are few 
departures from the expected. . . . 
Perhaps the key contributor to the occurrence of slips is automaticity. Slips are the result 
of actions which are not consciously monitored. Thus, experts are not immune from slips; 
rather, in some cases, the expert may be more prone to such errors. 
present research. Strong habit intrusions appear to occur most frequently, and are the 
result of frequent behaviors replacing less frequent ones. Strong habit intrusions may 
occur when 1) there is a change in routine (e.g., failure to stop at the grocer's on the way 
home from work as intended); 2) one's routine has not changed, but other circumstances 
have (e.g., walking to where one's favorite chair once was, only to recall that the furniture 
has been rearranged); and 3) behavior is "captured" by features of the environment (e. ., 
putting on one's coat instead of retrieving the box stored on the shelf of the coat close$. 
perceptions may be influenced by 1) frequency (unusual objects or events may be 
Of the many types of slip discussed, three were identified as being of interest to the 
Unusual or ambiguous situations may lead to misperceptions. The accuracy of 
misperceived as more common ones); 2) 
setting may not be accurately 
to clarify ambiguous details); and 4) 
(things which do not "belong" in a 
(the surrounding context may be used 
who is hungry may perceive 
ambiguous stimuli as food). 
Omissions or repetitions of steps in intended sequences of actions may be 
attributed toplace-losing errors. This type of error may be described as "failure of the 
program counter." Factors which may influence the occurrence of place-losing errors 
include forgetting an action which has already been performed, anticipation of actions to 
come, and recollection of a previous unresolved intention. 
Situations in Which SliDs Are Likely 
Based on this analysis, slips might be expected to occur in the following operational 
conditions: 
1. Salient environmental cues are not relevant to the current intention. 
2. Features of the environment have changed but the task to be accomplished has not 
(e.g., the arrangement of displays and controls has changed). 
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Finally, some mistakes arise due to reluctant rationality. Sustained attention to 
weighing available evidence and considering alternatives is difficult to maintain for long 
periods of time and humans have a tendency to "jump to conclusions." Thus, decisions 
may be heavily influenced by salient environmental cues, particularly if the are familiar 
leads to mistakes when the salient environmental cues are not sufficient for an adequate 
decision. 
and indicate solutions which are well-tried. This process is efficient most o r the time, but 
Conditions in Which Mistakes Are Likely 
an increased likelihood of mistakes: 
If the preceding analysis is accepted, then the following conditions should lead to 
1. Making an appropriate decision requires the simultaneous consideration of more 




The intended routine has changed but environmental features have not (e.g., a 
slight change in a well-practiced procedure). 




A long series of actions is required to accomplish a goal. 
The time period between related actions is long and/or filled with other activity. 
Procedures required to accomplish different goals are similar in places. 
Characteristics of Mistakes 
judgment and planning which have been well-documented in literature on decision 
making and problem solving. For example, decision makers appear to consider no more 
than two or three variables at a time. When retrieving information to be used in making a 
decision, some retrieval may be triggered by salient but irrelevant environmental cues. 
Attempts are then made to incorporate this irrelevant information into the decision. 
Recall of information is also biased toward availability, and the influence of past 
successes may be inappropriately large. Missing pieces of information may be supplied by 
the decision maker, based on his/her "theories" of what that information should be; later, 
it may be impossible to distinguish such self-generated information from the real thing. 
Once a hypothesis has been selected, there is a tendency to seek confirming evidence and 
"explain away" counter evidence. Finally, humans have a tendency to be overconfident of 
the correctness of their state of knowledge. 
mistakes. Some mistakes are due to bounded rationality, and are characterized by 
oversimplification of the problem. Thus, decisions made in situations in which the impact 
of several interacting variables should be considered may not be appropriate. 
solution, those approaches which have been successful in the past are most salient. The 
result is that decisions may be too bound to the past and too conservative. 
In discussing the origins of mistakes, Reason (1983) cites a number of biases in 
In light of these and other biases, Reason has identified three general sources of 
Some mistakes may be attributed to imperfect rationality. When searching for a 
2. 
3. 
Salient environmental cues suggest a solution which is inappropriate. 
An approach which is inappropriate for the current situation has been used 
successfully many times in simlar situations. 
4. Choice of a solution requires approaching the problem in a novel way. 
The Role of Workload 
In addition to the conditions listed above, another factor which may influence the 
occurrence of errors is imposed mental workload. Mental workload is not viewed as a 
cause of error, however, but rather as a catalyst. In other words, an increase in imposed 
mental workload may not lead to more errors unless other conditions are conducive to 
error. For example, incompatibilities in the design of displa s and controls may not result 
in slips if the human operator is "careful" and monitors hisAer actions closely. However, 
the requirement to perform more than one task may make it impossible to monitor one's 
actions as closely, and errors may result. 
While the possible impacts of imposed mental workload can be anticipated fair1 
easily, it is somewhat more difficult to predict the effects of subjective mental workloa dy 
on error. It is possible that low subjective load could be associated with more slips since 
the human may not feel a need to monitor lower-level actions. An increase in subjective 
mental workload might cause the human to "sit up and take notice," and monitor his/her 
actions more closely; on the other hand, high subjective load could be "distracting," and 
lead to even more slips. It is possible to make similar arguments for the effects of 
subjective load upon mistakes, dependent upon whether one views subjective load as 
motivational or stressful. 
Of course, the occurrence of an error may affect subjective mental load. If the 
error goes unnoticed by the human, chances are that the need to deal with any 
consequences of the error as they become manifest may increase subjective load. It also 
seems that higher subjective mental load might be associated with knowing one has 
committed an error, particularly if error correction is required. 
EXPERIMENT ONE 
The research described in the following pages was designed to accomplish two 
goals. First, a greater understanding of the causes of human error was sought by creating 
circumstances in which errors might be expected to occur and evaluating human behavior 
in those conditions. Second, investigation of the relationships between error and workload 
was planned. Both imposed load and subjective load were of interest. 
Subjects 
The six subjects were recruited through a local area technical school and were paid 
for participation. An effort was made to obtain subjects with training and orientation 
simlar to those of actual operators, although the pool of students in potentially relevant 
degree pro rams was small. Two of the subjects were sixth-quarter students in the school's 
program. One subject was a surth-quarter student in the data processing program, which 
placed heavy emphasis on troubleshooting of hardware and software. The sixth subject 
was not a student, but was employed full-time as the operator of a computer-based 
climate control system for a network of buildings. 
electromec i anical engineering program; two were first-quarter students in the electronics 
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Brief descrbtion of PLANT. The experimental task used was PLANT, a computer- 
driven simulation of a generic dynamic production process (Morris, Rouse, & Fath, 1985). 
During PLANT operation, both graphic and alphanumeric information is displayed to the 
PLANT operator via two color monitors. The graphic display for a sample PLANT 
problem is shown in Figure 1. 
C++ F59 I51 
Figure 1. PLANT graphic display. 
The system in Figure 1 contains nine tanks labeled A through I. Some of the tanks 
are currently connected by open valves, as indicated by lines between tanks. Numbers 
beneath tanks represent the current levels of fluid in them. (The I t +  + I t  under tank C 
indicates a level that is too high to be displayed and, therefore, unsafe.) Fluid enters the 
PLANT system at the left and exits at the right as finished product. 
In general, the PLANT operator's task is to supervise the flow of fluid through the 
series of tanks interconnected by pumps, valves, and pipes so as to produce an unspecified 
product. The operator may open and close valves, adjust system input and output, check 
flows between tanks, and order repairs of various PLANT components by typing 
commands at the keyboard. Maximizing production is the primary goal. However, as in 
real systems, the "physical" limitations of the system (such as tank capacity or reliability of 
system components) require that the PLANT operator be concerned with secondary goals 
as well. Among these secondary goals are stabilization of the system, and detection, 
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diagnosis, and compensation for system failures. Instability is manifest by valve "trips" 
(automatic closing of valves by the PLANT safety system). The symptoms of failure are 
varied, as discussed below. 
Modifications to PLANT. The current version of PLANT is implemented in Pascal 
on an IBM PC/AT and uses two Amdek 600 color monitors. Verbal ratings of mental 
effort were obtained via a Votan VPC 2000 speech recognition and playback device. A 
headset contained both the speaker and microphone. When ratings were requested, a 
horizontal ten-point scale was prominently displayed above the monitor containing the 
PLANT gra hics display. "RATE YOUR MENTAL EFFORT ap eared above the scale; 
descriptors i! elow the scale included "extremely low effort" below t IR e number 1, 
"extremely high effort" below the number 10, and "moderate effort" centered below 5 and 
6. 
For pu oses of this experiment, PLANT was modified in the following ways. First, 
the capability 1F or forced- acing was implemented so that PLANT could be updated 
automatically if desired. (!In previous experiments, PLANT was self-paced only.) When 
forced-pacing was in effect, PLANT was automatically updated every 4 sec. 
The way in which PLANT commands were entered was also changed. PLANT 
commands consist of two parts: a two-letter action (e.g., "ov" = open valve), lus a 
s ecified object ("ovad = open valve A-D) or quantity ("pi100 = pump in 1 B 0 units). 
Zeys on the AT keyboard were redefined so that the two-letter commands could be 
entered with single keystrokes (but echoed on the alphanumeric screen as two letters). 
The number pad was used for specifymg the remainder of the command. Digits retained 
their normal positions on the number pad; the nine tanks in PLANT (three rows by three 
columns) were also represented with the letters A through I on the keys corresponding to 
the digits one through nine. 
Thus, issuing a PLANT command involved a minimum of three keystrokes: 1) 
action selection from the alphabetic keyboard, 2) selection of object or quantity from the 
number pad, and 3) a carriage return. Echoing a number or letter in response to pressing 
a key on the number pad was determined by the type of information required by the 
action selected. Necessary keys were clearly marked with adhesive labels, and all other 
keys were covered and disabled. 
The most substantial change to PLANT involved increasing the number of failure 
types which could occur. Possible failures could be grou ed into two broad classes. Valve 
and internal pump failures involved a stoppabe of fluid 8 ow through one or more valves, 
and were considered simple ailures. Diagnosis of a valve or pump failure was based on a 
valves. The other types of failure that could occur were complex failures, and included 
failure of an input or output pump, tank rupture, display failure, and safety system failure. 
Accurate diagnosis of one of these failures was not possible with a single source of 
information, but rather required consulting two or three sources. There was, however, 
always sufficient evidence available to make an unambiguous diagnosis. Each piece of 
information used could be symptomatic of more than one failure, so that unambiguous 
diagnosis required integration of the available symptoms. 
Emerimental Procedure 
single unambiguous piece o f information, a flow reading of 0.00 through one or more 
Subjects controlled PLANT for 26 periods (or "production runs") of approximately 
20 min each. Each production run consisted of 350 system updates or iterations. Unless 
otherwise noted, production runs were self-paced. Production runs were grouped into 14 
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one-hour sessions. The first eight sessions were training sessions and consisted of 
production runs interspersed with instructions as described below. Experimental 
conditions were manipulated in the last six sessions. Subjects were allowed to complete as 
many sessions per visit as they wished. 
Training sessions. At the beginning of session 1, subjects received written and 
verbal imtruct:on in the basics of PLANT operation. The simple valve and pump failures 
were the only types of failure discussed at this time, and were the only types to occur in 
production runs until the later introduction of the complex failures. A formal test of the 
material was administered at the end of session 2 after the subjects had controlled 
PLANT for two production rum. 
were available in hard-copy form during all subsequent production runs. Subjects also 
began keeping logs in session 3 and continued for the remainder of the experiment. The 
experimenter explained that the logs would help her to understand "why they did what 
they did," and that they should make notes which might explain their actions while 
controlling PLANT. The subjects understood that these notes were to be made Itat their 
convenience" and were not to interfere with PLANT control. 
Procedures for PLANT operation were provided at the beginning of session 3, and 
The effort-rating process was introduced in session 4. For each subject, the Votan 
speech recognition system was trained to recognize the spoken numbers "one" through 
"ten." Subjects were then asked to rate their mental effort (when prompted) on a scale of 
one to ten, with ten being the highest. All subjects indicated that they could comply with 
this request without difficulty, and there did not appear to be any confusion as to what 
was being asked of them. 
Every tenth iteration, subjects were prompted through the Votan headset with the 
recorded word "effort." If a recognizable rating was not obtained within three iterations, 
the prompt "again" was heard. Subjects were informed that the second prompt was an 
indication that Votan had not understood them the first time, and that they should try to 
speak more clearly. If a recognizable rating was not obtained within eight iterations 
following the first prompt, the failure to obtain a rating was noted in the data file. 
At the beginning of session 5, information about the nature and diagnosis of 
complex failures was provided. Each of the complex failures occurred at least once during 
the next seven production runs (runs 8-14), and the manner in which they should be 
diagnosed was reviewed frequently with subjects. Forced pacing was introduced in 
production runs 12-14. 
every 75-80 iterations. Prior to production run 13, subjects had experienced no more than 
one complex failure per run. In run 13, there were three complex failures, and all subjects 
experienced at least two of them concurrently due to failure to repair one before another 
occurred. Immediately after run 13, subjects were given the opportunity to "recalibrate" 
their effort ratings. They were first asked to imagine and describe the easiest possible 
situation in PLANT (the most commonly noted was start-up at the beginning of a 
production run), and assign that situation a very low effort rating of perhaps one or two. 
Then, they described a very difficult situation (most referred to the production run just 
completed), and were asked to give that situation a very high effort rating close to ten. 
Before beginning run 14, it was suggested that they use the imagined situations as 
reference points when assigning effort ratings in the future. All subjects said they thought 
they could comply with this suggestion. 
Effort ratings were requested every 10 iterations in all subsequent production runs. 
Each production run contained five failures, with one occurring approximately 
a 
Emerimental sessions. The experimental conditions were manipulated in sessions 
9-14 (production runs 15-26). Three characteristics of PLANT were varied: 1) pacing, 2) 
display-control compatibility, and 3) the types of failure which could occur in a production 
run. 
Im osed load was manipulated by making PLANT forced-paced (high load) or 
self-pace B (low load). Variation of display-control compatibility was expected to alter the 
likelihood of slips occurring (i.e., errors in entering intended commands). In the 
"compatible" (low-slip) condition, the arrangement of tank labels on the number pad was 
isomorphic to the arrangement of tanks on the PLANT 
that rows became columns and vice versa; digits, however, always occupied the same 
positions. 
aphic display. In the 
"incompatible" (high-slip) condition, the tank labels on t I? e number pad were inverted so 
The expected likelihood of mistakes (in the form of incorrect diagnoses) was 
manipulated b controlling the types of failure which occurred during a production run. In 
"complex failure" (high-mistake) condition included two complex failures and three simple 
failures. 
the "simple fai r ure" (low-mistake) condition, only simple failures occurred. Failures in the 
Factorial combination of these attributes resulted in eight experimental conditions. 
Subjects controlled three production runs under each of the compatible, complex failure 
conditions (i.e.? three each under forced- and self-pacing). So that the complex failure and 
incompatible situations would be more unusual and (hopefully) generate more errors, 
subjects controlled only one roduction run for each condition involving one of the high- 
error manipulations. The or B er of presentation for the twelve e erimental production 
runs was determined pseudorandomly with the constraints that 'ip com atible, sim le 
failure runs were interspersed fairly evenly throughout the sequence, 2 P no more t K an two 
runs of the same pacing occurred in sequence, and 3) high-error conditions occurred in 
self-paced runs before they occurred in forced-paced runs. The same order of presentation 
was used for all subjects. 
Dependent Measures 
Four classes of de endent measure were considered. These included 1) 
performance measures, 27 errors, 3) effort ratings, and 4) other behavioral measures. 
Performance measures. The primary index of performance in controlling PLANT 
was the amount of production achieved. Based on previous experience with PLANT, a 
number of other indices of performance were used. Among these were 1) frequency of 
automatic valve closings on the part of the safety system ("trips"), 2) average number of 
open valves er iteration, 3) average levels of input and output specified, 4) average 
variance in w uid levels across the system, 5) average number of iterations to repair simple 
failures, and 6) average number of iterations to repair complex failures. 
Errors. By examining the transaction files created during PLANT operation, it was 
possible to identify a number of actions which were erroneous. Only those actions which 
were unambiguously incorrect or inappropriate were designated as errors. All of the 
errors noted could be classified as such by considering the immediate PLANT context; 
there was no attempt to infer subjects' intentions from a sequence of actions and judge 
those intentions as appropriate or inappropriate. Thus, most of the errors discussed would 
be considered slips rather than mistakes. 
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Based on detailed analysis of transaction files from an earlier pilot study, five 
categories of error were distinguished. Uncorrected syntax errors (“UNCSYN) consisted of 
actions entered by the subject that were syntactically incorrect (e.g., an incomplete 
specification of a valve or a command to open a valve which did not exist). Corrected 
syntax errors (TORSYNI) were identical to uncorrected syntax errors, with the exception 
that the subject corrected them (via backspacing) before entering a carriage return. 
A third class of error, inappropriate actions (“INAPP), included actions which were 
syntactically correct, but to which PLANT could not respond. Examples of such errors 
were attempting to dispatch the repair crew while they were already occupied, opening a 
valve that was already open, or setting the input rate to its current value. Exarmnation of 
the data revealed that the primary source of INAPP errors was opening valves which were 
already open. This appeared to be due to the subjects’ open-loop control of PLANT @e., 
entering a sequence of commands without waiting for the system to update between 
commands). 
The fourth class of actions considered in the error analysis consisted of commands 
actions. It was 
corrections of 
the results 
which were syntactically correct but 
impossible to determine whether these 
ographical errors (which happened to be 
?changes in subjects’ intentions (which 
fault or repairing a PLANT component that had not failed. E areful examination of the 
actions were noted as interesting behavior and retained as a separate category when 
analyzing errors. 
The final category of error included only errors of dia nosis: failing to repair a 
data in this experiment revealed that inappropriate repair of a component could be 
clearly construed as a slip in only one instance: an experienced subject observed a flow 
reading of zero (an unambiguous indication of a valve failure) and then repaired the 
wrong valve. In all other cases, inappropriate repair appeared to be the result of 
misdia nosis. This slip was included in the UNCSYN catego 
subjecg and the others were considered mistakes (“MIST&S). 
rating, and 2) the number of ten-iteration intervals in which ratings were not reco 
ratings per run was possible. Occasionally no rating was received within a ten-iteration 
interval. Examination of data files revealed that Votan was quite sensitive to extraneous 
low-level speech (e.g., subjects talking to themselves), and that multiple ratings were 
frequently obtained (due to ina propriate classification of extraneous speech as digits by 
necessary, a missing rating was interpreted as absence of a response from the subject 
rather than a failure of Votan to understand a verbal rating. 
Multiple ratings were resolved by blind experimenter judgment, with no knowledge 
of the experimental conditions associated with any given series of ratings. In the rare cases 
in which it was not possible to be confident of the true rating, the rating was recorded as 
missing. 
Other behavioral measures. Elapsed real time between actions was also noted, as 
was the frequency with which each type of PLANT command was issued successfully (i.e., 
excluding errors). 
(as suggested by the 
Effort ratin%. Two characteristics of effort ratings were noted: 1) the value of each 
by Votan. Each production run consisted of 350 iterations, so a maximum of 35 e rd fort 
Votan). In light of these multip P e ratings and the fact that subjects were prompted twice if 
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RESULTS 
The following discussion of statistical 
The fact that the results require a complicated descri 
the opportunities for complexity afforded by the 
exarmned. Following the detailed resentation coherent and 
measures 
succinct interpretation of the resu P ts is provided. 
made many more errors than did the other subjects. Conversations with these su E jects 
Based on examinations of data files and interviews with subjects, it was determined 
that the control behavior of two subjects was erratic and departed radically from 
prescribed approaches to controlling PLANT. These subjects (coincidentally, the two first- 
quarter electronics students) achieved much less production, kept fewer valves o en, and 
revealed that departures from prescribed PLANT control were not the result of differing 
strategies, but rather reflected a lack of understanding of PLANT. (For example, they 
could not answer questions about PLANT drawn from the written instructions they had 
received at the beginning of the experiment.) Thus, the decision was made to exclude 
their data from further analysis, and the results reported here are based on data from four 
subjects. 
The analyses performed fell into two categories. First, the effects of experimental 
conditions on the dependent measures were investigated. Three-way analysis of variance 
with repeated measures was the primary statistical tool used for this purpose. In discussing 
the results of these analyses, the factors are designated as follows: Compatibility 
(compatible vs. incompatible keyboard arrangement), Failure Complexlty (simple failures 
only vs. both simple and complex failures), and Pacin (self- or forced-pacing). In addition 
measures were also explored using time series analysis. 
to examining the effects of experimental conditions, t k e relationships between dependent 
Effects of Experimental Conditions 
Performance and other behavioral measures. Of the many performance measures 
recorded, only two were significantly affected by experimental conditions. There was a 
significant interaction effect of compatibility and Pacing on production (F( 1,3) = 9.96, p 
= .OS). Production was lower in the compatible, forced-paced condition than in the other 
three combinations of Compatibility and Pacing (94,171 vs. a mean of 109,240). 
There was a three-way interaction effect (F( 43) = 36.64, p = .01) of Failure 
Complexity, Compatibili , and Pacing on the average level of out ut specified per output 
command. In the simple r ailure conditions, the effects of Compati E ility and Pacing were 
similar to those described for roduction: lower levels of output were specified in the 
com atible, forced-paced con B ition than in the other three combinations of Compatibility 
complex failure conditions: average out ut was approximately equal in the two forced- 
and incompatible, self-paced (110.90) conditions. The latter two were also different from 
each other. 
and ; acing (99.52 vs. a mean of 109.57). However, the effects were different in the 
paced conditions (a mean of 89.75), an B lower than in the compatible, self-paced (101.78) 
Command usage across experimental conditions is presented graphically in Figures 
2 and 3. Four categories of command are represented in these figures: 1) repair of 
PLANT components (Ireprs"); 2) flow readings ("flows"); 3) adjustments to input or output 
(Ipi/po," short for "pump in/pump out"); and 4) opening or closing valves ("op/cl"). The 
three-letter labels on the abscissa represent the eight experimental conditions. These 
letters refer to the Failure Complexity (Simple vs. Complex), Compatibility (Compatible 
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vs. Incompatible), and Pacing (self vs. Forced) manipulations, respectively. 
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Figure 2. Command usage across experimental conditions--Experiment One. 
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Figure 3. Percent of each type of command used across experimental 
conditions--Experiment One. 
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Analysis of command usage revealed the following significant effects. More 
commands were issued in compatible runs than in incompatible runs (169 vs. 146, F( 1,3) 
= 20.61, p = .02). Closer examination indicated that this difference was attributable 
primarily to a difference in the number of "open" and "close" commands issued in those 
runs (109 vs. 88, F( 1,3) = 20.67, p = .02). The number of input and output commands 
issued was significantly affected by Pacing (34 for self-paced rum vs. 39 for forced-paced 
runs, F(1,3) = 1 2 . 1 3 , ~  = .04). 
Frequency of flow readin s was affected by the interaction of Failure Complexity, 
Compatibility, and Pacing (F(1,37 = 5 5 . 5 6 , ~  = .005). Fewer flow commands were issued 
in the complex failure, incompatible, self-paced condition than in any others (10.75). The 
eatest number of flow commands were issued in the com lex failure, incompatible, 
(which were approximately equal, with a mean of 20. P 8). There were no differences in 
flow readings among the other experimental conditions (a mean of 15.06). 
grced-paced condition and in the simple failure, com atib P e, forced-paced condition 
As a final observation relative to the behavioral measures. subiects comdeted self- 
paced runs in 21% less time than forced-paced runs (18.5 vs. 23.3 miiutes, F(1:3) = 10.14, 
p = .OS). 
Error measures. Errors observed in each experimental condition are presented 
graphically in Figures 4 and 5. Si nificant differences may be summarized as follows. 
Forced-pacing resulted in more 8ORSYN errors (4.73 vs. 2.59 with self-pacing, F(1,3) = 
3 4 . 3 1 , ~  = .01) and more total syntax errors (Le., UNCSYN + CORSYN) (11.27 vs. 5.51 
with self-pacing, F( 1,3) = 12.14, p = .04). Also in the e ected direction were the 
Forced-pacing vs. 5.72 with self-pacing, F( 1,3) = 9.21, p = .06). 
marginal effects of Pacing on UNCSYN errors (7.11 wit T forced-pacing vs. 2.86 with self- 
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Figure 5. Percent of each type of error occurring across experimental 
conditions--Experiment One. 
Two effects of Failure Complexity were noted. First, the frequency of OKCHNG 
was greater in the simple failure conditions than in complex failure conditions (5.62 vs. 
2.56, F(1,3) = 15.19, p = .03). Second, there were marginally more MISTAKES 
associated with complex failure conditions (2.37 vs. 1.69 with simple failure conditions, 
F(1,3) = 8 . 8 9 , ~  = .06). 
Com atibili 
occurred in the com lex failure, incompatible condition (3.0) than in the other three 
failure, compatible condition (4.7) than in either the simple failure, incompatible (6.25 or 
complex failure, compatible (6.0) conditions. 
Both the Failure Com lexity x Compatibility and Failure Complexity x Pacing 
The remaining effects involved the interaction of Failure Complexity with either 
or Pacing. The Failure Complexity x Compatibility interaction had a 
signi F ?  icant e fect on UNCSYN errors (F(1,3) = 20.67,~ = .02). Fewer UNCSYN errors 
P combinations of Fai P ure Complexity and Compatibility, and fewer occurred in the com lex 
interactions had significant e P fects upon INAPP errors. Regarding the Failure Complexity 
the simple failure, H orced-paced conditions than in the other combinations of Failure 
x Compatibility interaction (F( 1,3) = 35.17, p = .Ol), more INAPP errors occurred in the 
simple failure, incompatible conditions than in the other three combinations of Failure 
Complexity and compatibility (12.0 vs. a mean of 7.1). Considering the Failure 
Complexity x Pacin interaction (F(1,3) = 21.03,~ = .02), more INAPP errors occurred in 
Complexity and Pacing (15.14 vs. a mean of 6.0). 
Surprisingly, there was no significant main effect of Compatibility on errors. 
However, examination of errors occurring during the first ten iterations of production runs 
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revealed that a total of 12 errors occurred in the first ten iterations of incompatible runs, 
whereas only 6.3 errors occurred in the first ten iterations of compatible runs. (The 
number cited for compatible runs is not an integer because it has been adjusted for 
multiple simple failure, compatible runs.) 
number of effort ratin8s received were observed. Fewer ratings were obtained in the 
complex failure conditions than in the simple failure conditions (29.5 vs. 31.1, F(1,3) = 
11.04, p = .05), and fewer ratings were received in the forced- aced conditions than in the 
self-paced conditions 29.5 vs. 31.1, F(1,3) = 2 1 . 1 7 , ~  = .02). &en missing values were 
treated as missing data (i.e., the analysis included compensation for unequal cell sizes), no 
differences in the values of ratings were found. In light of the pattern of differences in 
number of ratings obtained, missing ratings were assigned a value of 10 and the analysis 
was repeated; however, no differences in magnitude of ratings were observed. 
Relationships Between Measures 
As noted, relationships between dependent measures were investigated using time 
series anal sis. Four variables were compared: production, number of open valves, total 
Values of the other three variables were computed for each ten-iteration interval during 
the production run; comparisons with effort ratings involved values for the ten iterations 
preceding the rating. 
Effort ratings. Significant differences due to Failure Complexity and Pacing in the 
errors, an cr effort ratings. Recall that effort ratings were requested every ten iterations. 
Full analyses were performed for each individual production run, resulting in 48 
analyses (4 subjects x 12 sessions). Autocorrelations for each variable and cross- 
correlations for each pair of variables were obtained. Although several significant 
relationships were noted, it was apparent in light of the large number of results and plots 
that some aggregation was needed to facilitate interpretation. 
computing mean values for each point in the function), and the results were plotted. For 
some production runs the averaged functions exhibited clear relationships between 
variables, whereas for others the relationships were not strong. However, these differences 
in relationships between variables did not appear to be related to any of the experimental 
treatments. 
"Averaged correlation functions were created by collapsing across subjects (i.e., 
Averaged functions were then created for each subject by colla sing across 
conditions. Observation of the plots of the resulting functions reveale B strong similarities 
across subjects. Thus, as a final step, a single plot was created for each variable and pair 
of variables by collapsing across both subjects and conditions. Those plots which exhibited 
clear relationships (i.e., autocorrelations or cross-correlations exceeding 20.3) are shown 
in Figures 6 through 10. 
the summary plots rather than the original results of the time series anal ses. However, it 
analyses, as discussed here. 
It is easier to obtain an overall perspective of the results obtained by considering 
is important to note the extent to which the summary is representative o r individual 
Autocorrelations. Referring to Figure 6, the relationship of production to itself was 
strong and positive, and observed to a greater or lesser degree in all 48 analyses. The 
strongest relationship was found with a lag of one interval @e., one ten-iteration period of 
approximately 31-40 sec, dependent on pacing condition). As may be ascertained from 
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Figure 6. Autocorrelation function for PLANT production--Experiment One. 
A smaller but equally consistent positive autocorrelation was observed for number 
of open valves. (See Figure 7.) The strongest relationship was also noted with a lag of 
one, and the reduction of the relationship with a lag of two was even greater than in the 
case of production. 
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Figure 7. Autocorrelation function for number of open valves--Experiment One. 
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Significant positive autocorrelations of effort ratings were found in 75% of the 
analyses. As with production and number of open valves, the stron est relationship was 
autocorrelation was not as great as those observed for production and number of open 
valves, and the time span for the relationship was longer. 
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Figure 8. Autocorrelation function for effort ratings--Experiment One. 
Autocorrelations of errors were consistently low and non-significant. 
Cross-correlations. Consistent relationships were observed with only two of the 
possible pairs of variables. First, as shown in Figure 9, the number of open valves was 
positively related to production. As might be expected, this was true only for positive lags 
(i.e., increased number of open valves preceded increased production). The strongest 
relationship was noted with a lag of one, but there were also noteworthy relationships 
with lags of two and three. 
Referring to Figure 10, negative cross-correlations were observed between effort 
ratings and production in 44 of the original analyses. In all of these cases, increased effort 
ratings preceded decreased production. The strongest relationship was usually observed 
with lags of one or two, and this relationship often persisted through lags of three or four. 
As a note, no consistent relationships between effort ratings and errors were noted. 
Significant correlations were observed in only 18 of the 48 analyses. Of these, however, 17 
of the correlations were positive, with a mean of .348. Eight of the significant correlations 
involved changes in effort preceding changes in errors, with a mean lag of 1.6. In ten of 
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Figure 10. Cross-correlation function for effort ratings x production--Experiment One. 
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DISCUSSION 
The following discussion seeks to provide an inte retation of the results that is 
consistent with trends observed in the data. As noted wit rI: the presentation of statistical 
statistically significant relations h ips. Further, the picture painted here does not take into 
analyses, a rather complicated pattern of results was obtained. In order to develop a 
coherent explanation of the findings, some elaboration of the results was required. Thus, 
although this discussion is firml based on the data obtained, not all statements refer to 
account every significant effect noted and is, therefore, not complete. 
Effects of Experimental Conditions 
First, consider the effects the experimental manipulations had upon subjects’ 
behavior. Regarding the effects of the incompatible keyboard layout, the absence of a 
significant main effect of Compatibility indicates that this manipulation did not pose a 
great problem for the subjects. A parently, subjects had a few problems at the beginning 
of incompatible production runs P as suggested by the higher incidence of errors during the 
first ten iterations), but they adapted to the incompatible keyboard fairly quickly. Judging 
from the reduction in commands issued, one way in which they adapted was to avoid using 
the keyboard. The incompatible condition did have some detnmental effects, as indicated 
by the interactions with other experimental factors and the increase in errors over 
compatible conditions, but these effects were overshadowed by the impacts of the other 
mampulations. 
In contrast, the problems created by Pacing manipulations were more evident, as 
illustrated by higher frequencies of syntax errors. Thus, the hypothesis that increased 
imposed load would be associated wth more errors was sup orted. In light of the finding 
Pacing were due to the forced-paced nature of the task rather than to a reduction in time 
allowed. The apparent response of subjects to forced pacing was to become more 
conservative. In the absence of other manipulations, forced pacing led subjects to scale 
back on output and hence achieve less production. 
The manipulations of Compatibility and Pacing interacted in their effects on 
subjects’ behavior. For example, in the incompatible conditions there was no reduction in 
output associated with forced pacinp. Additionally, forced pacing seemed to enhance the 
detrimental effects of the incompatible keyboard. 
difficult to interpret, largely due to the interactions of this factor with the other 
experimental variables. If we consider the effects of the complex failure manipulation in 
isolation, the apparent impact was to cause sub’ects to monitor the s stem more closely, 
resulting in more closed-loop control. (Recall t e lower fre uency o r INAPP errors, which 
were largely associated with open-loop control, in the comp ex failure conditions.) The 
higher incidence of UNCSYN errors associated with the complex failure, compatible 
conditions suggests that, while subjects focused more on the state of the system, they paid 
less attention to the details of entering their actions at the keyboard. As with forced 
pacin , the complex failure manipulation had a conservative influence upon subjects’ 
that self-paced runs were completed in less time than force B -paced runs, the effects of 
The effects of the Failure Complexity manipulation were more complicated and 
7 h 
speci B ication of output. 
When combined with other e erimental variables, the complex failure 
manipulation served to reduce the ef T ects of those variables upon observed performance. 
Consider the Failure Complexity x Compatibility interaction. There was an apparent 
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increase in INAPP errors associated with incompatible conditions. However, this increase 
did not occur when the incompatible keyboard was combined with com lex failures, 
compatibility manipulation seemed to have a reciprocal effect upon errors associated with 
the complex failure conditions. Apparently the incompatible keyboard caused subjects to 
focus on the details of command entry enough to avoid the increase in UNCSYN errors 
found in complex failure, compatible conditions. 
The complex failure condition also attenuated the effects of forced pacing. Again, 
this effect was most evident in the frequency of INAPP errors. Of the two variables, 
however, Pacing was more potent in its effects upon behavior. The effects of forced pacing 
were reduced with complex failures, but not eliminated. 
collecting data, it was hypothesized that this would be the most difficult condition for 
subjects. However, the low incidence of errors in this condition (as illustrated in F i y  4) 
might lead one to believe that this was not the case. It seems unreasonable to conc ude 
that this condition was easier than, for example, either of the simple failure, incompatible 
conditions, so an alternative interpretation is offered. It is hypothesized that subjects were 
more careful in this condition, and, thus, avoided making errors. This "greater care" 
hypothesis is further supported by the hi h percentage of errors which were self-corrected 
accompanied complex failure or forced-paced conditions did not occur when combined 
with the incompatible keyboard. One possible conjecture is that subjects focused more on 
details of command entry and events occurring within the system (Le., failures), and were 
less aware of the more global system output. 
It is curious that no effects of experimental conditions were observed relative to 
the magnitude of effort ratings. If subjects used reater care (Le., exercised greater effort) 
ratings would be found. Reliable differences in the frequency of missing ratings suggest 
that there were differences in subjective effort, but these were not reflected in rating 
magnitude. Further discussion of effort ratings is deferred to a later section. 
Relationships Between Measures 
presumably because subjects were monitoring the system more closely. f nterestingly, the 
Consider now the complex failure, incompatible, forced-paced condition. Prior to 
(CORSYN) in this condition. Interesting H y, the reduction in system output which usually 
in some conditions than in others, then it might % e expected that differences in effort 
Now consider the observed relationships amon the dependent measures. 
Autocorrelations and cross-correlations involving pro c f  uction and number of open valves 
require little interpretation. They simply reflect the orderly dynamics of PLANT, and do 
not offer insights into human behavior. Therefore, the focus here will be on those 
relationships involving errors and/or effort ratings. 
First, recall that no consistent autocorrelations of error were found. Thus, there is 
no evidence to support the intuitively appealing notion that errors lead to more errors. It 
is feasible that the typically low frequencies of error could have made it difficult to find 
statistically reliable relationships; althou h nearly 40 errors were noted in the worst 
no errors occurred; It is also possible that relationships could have been obscured if the 
ten-iteration sampling interval was too large. However, use of smaller intewals was 
avoided in light of the low frequencies of error. As a result, little can be said about any 
time-varying characteristics of error which might exist. 
performance (production and number of open valves). Most likely, this was because 
condition (simple failure, incompatible, H orced-paced), there were many intervals in which 
No reliable relationships were found between errors and indices of PLANT 
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PLANT is very forgiving. In fact, most of the categories of error considered in this 
experiment are "trapped by the interface to PLANT and can have no im act upon the 
these measures is not difficult to accept. 
significant correlations were positive, but significant relationships were not noted reliably 
across conditions or subjects. This does not appear to be a failure of several marginal 
relationships to achieve the traditionally accepted significance level of .05; in at least half 
of the cases, no relationship at all was evident. Among the cases in which significant 
correlations were noted, increases in effort ratings preceded increased errors in 
approximately half of them and followed error increases in the other half. Thus, relative 
to the questions of whether perceived effort serves as a catalyst for error or error 
contributes to perceived effort, the present results suggest that either relationship is 
possible. 
consistent autocorrelations, and 2) prediction of chan es in production. Regarding the 
number of interesting possibilities emerge. 
system. Additionally, the measures of roduction and number of open va P ves are rather 
global measures. Thus, the failure to H ind any reliable relationships between errors and 
There were also no consistent relationships between errors and effort ratings. All 
Recall the other relationships involving effort ratings. Two are of interest here: 1) 
autocorrelations, when one considers the factors whic i might contribute to such a result, a 
For example, subjects' perceptions of effort could be closely related to the current 
PLANT state, and changes in ratings merely reflect the cyclical nature of PLANT 
operation associated with less-than-optimal control strategies (Le., a cyclical attern of 
rating when C f  eciding what the current rating should be and used the previous rating as an 
anchor for the current one. Yet another possibility, which is purely conjecture at this 
point, is that changes in perceived effort do not occur abruptly (at least in benign 
situations such as those encountered in PLANT), but rather evolve over time. Upon 
encounterin a problem, subjective effort may increase as the problem persists; similarly, 
losing and re aining system stability). Alternatively, subjects could have reca f led their last 
subjective e B fort could dissipate gradually once the problem is resolved. 
any or all of t rl em. Understanding the reasons for the autoregressive nature of the effort 
These ossibilities are not mutually exclusive; a given rating could be influenced by 
ratings noted here will require a greater understanding of the factors on which the effort 
ratings were based. Unfortunately, the data obtained in this experiment do little to 
enhance such an understanding. 
In light of the fairly consistent negative relationship between effort ratin s and 
production, it may be stated with some confidence that the effort ratings did re a ect 
something relevant to PLANT operation. The discovery that increases in effort ratings 
foreshadowed decreased production during the next 20-40 iterations was quite interesting. 
It was also puzzling, however, because there were no other relationships observed which 
could account for increases in effort ratings. Ratings were not related to experimental 
condition, frequency of error, or PLANT state (i.e., number of open valves). Solving the 
puzzle is difficult without extrapolation. A hypothesis is offered, but first it is necessary to 
step back and consider the overall pattern of results obtained. 
A Broader Perspective 
As noted near the beginning of this report, this research was conducted with two 
goals in mind: 1) investigating the causes of human error, and 2) investigating the 
relationships between error and mental workload. As often happens in research, several 
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outcomes of this experiment were not as expected. Manipulating imposed load via pacing 
resulted in more errors, as predicted; however, the other e erimental manipulations 
the results are informative. 
failed to roduce the anticipated effects, and the resulting 7 ata is difficult to interpret. 
Neverthe Y ess, if we examine the manner in which subjects responded in this experiment, 
It was hypothesized that humans would be more likely to make errors under 
certain conditions. As an evaluation of this idea, we created those conditions, placed 
eople in them, and waited for the human subjects to provide a demonstration of our 
[ypothesis. However, what we received was not verification of our predictions, but rather 
a demonstration of human ada tability. If the interpretation of results offered thus far is 
and took steps to compensate for those situations. In incompatible conditions, they 
reduced their use of the incompatible keyboard; in complex failure and forced-paced 
conditions, they scaled back on s stem output (which would have the effect of making 
try to render them less error-likely. 
back also sheds new light on the relationship between effort ratings and PLANT 
production and the puzzling absence of effects due to experimental conditions. The 
negative correlation between effort ratin s and PLANT production indicates that subjects 
result in a more stable PLANT, and if subjective effort was affected by PLANT state, a 
lower level of perceived effort. 
altering their control strategies. Note that apparently compensatory control strategies 
occurred in the complex failure and forced-pacing conditions--those conditions in which 
increased subjective effort was expected. If subjects were able to reduce subjective effort 
in those conditions, this could explain the failure to note differences in effort ratings 
associated with experimental manipulations. 
accepted, then the subjects rea P ized they were in situations in which errors were likely, 
PLANT more stable). In short, t i e subjects' response to the error-likely conditions was to 
responded to increased subjective effort % y reducing system output. As noted, this would 
The possibility that subjects compensated for troublesome conditions by scaling 
Hence, to a certain extent subjects could regulate their level of subjective effort by 
Similar arguments could be use to explain the absence of relationships between 
effort ratings and other measures. For example, sup ose that subjective effort and error 
adopting a compensatory strategy, a subject could avoid committing errors by responding 
to increased perceived effort as a signal to scale back before the errors occurred. In the 
resulting data, no relationship between effort and errors would be apparent. 
are in fact positively related, and that increases in e P fort precede increased error. By 
EXPERIMENT TWO 
In light of the results of the first experiment, the second experiment was conducted 
with two goals in mind. First, an effort was to be made to curtail subjects' ada tation to 
production). It was hoped that a production bonus would help achieve this objective. The 
second goal was to ain greater understanding of the factors leading to increases in 
approach used was in-de th questioning of subjects as they observed "instant replays" of 
appeared to have little impact upon behavior in the first experiment, this manipulation 
was omitted. 
experimental conditions by changing PLANT control strategies (primarily, sca P ing back on 
perceived effort an Lf the effects of these perceptions on subsequent behavior. The 
their behavior in control P ing PLANT. As manipulation of display-keyboard compatibility 
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Subjects in this experiment were the four persons whose data were analyzed in the 
previous experiment. During the one-year interval since Experiment One was conducted, 
the three students had received their degrees from the technical school, and all were 
employed in jobs that were at least moderately related to the training they had received. 
One worked in a data processing department for a small company, one maintained 
personal computers, and one maintained copy machines. The fourth subject was still 
employed as an operator of a climate-control system. 
Experimental Procedure 
Subjects controlled PLANT for a total of 13 production rum. These production 
runs were a subset of those encountered by subjects during Experiment One. Although all 
of the problems seen had been presented earlier, subjects gave no indication that the 
roduction runs were familiar to them. Since the production runs differed onl in the 
ication and timin of generic failures (e.g., failure of pump A at time 73 vs. r ailure of 
pum C at time 84 7 , it is unlikely that the specifics of a given run could have been 
reca P led from the year before. 
they would be asked to exp P ain their actions in detail at a later time. 
The first seven sessions were training, in which relevant features of PLANT (i.e., 
the basics of PLANT operation, operational procedures, and simple and complex PLANT 
failures) were successively reintroduced. The effort-rating procedure was also 
reintroduced during trainin . Subjects were told at the beginning of the experiment that 
At the beginning of the seventh production run (the last training session), subjects 
were informed that a roduction bonus would be awarded for each of the last six 
production runs (8-13 P . It was explained that they were being told this in advance so that, 
if they wanted to change strategies as a result of this information, they could try out the 
new strategy before it counted. The recise calculation of the bonus was not discussed; 
and that the amount would depend on how much he/she produced and how much the 
other subjects produced. It was further suggested that the total amount of bonus money 
received by each subject could be "anywhere from $5 to $50." (In actuality, each subject 
received approximately $30.) 
explanations of their behavior was introduced. First, the e erimenter generated a hard- 
they did what they did," and "w at they were thinking and feeling" as they controlled 
PLANT. It was then explained that the production run would be replayed as the subject 
watched, and the subject was to "talk throu h' what was happening. Explanations were to 
production run was replayed in self-paced mode as the subject watched, and the ensuing 
discussion between the subject and experimenter was taped. 
Experimental manipulations were presented in the last six production runs. The 
two expenmental factors were Pacing (self- vs. forced-paced) and Failure Complexity 
(simple failures onl vs. both simple and complex failures). Subjects controlled PLANT 
failure, forced-paced), and once under each of the complex failure conditions. 
Experimental production runs were presented pseudorandomly, as in Experiment One. 
however, each subject was told that K e/she would definitely get some money for each run, 
At the end of the seventh production run, the technique for eliciting subjects' 
copy lot of the effort ratings obtained over the course of T t e production run, and showed 
the p P ot to the subject. The sub'ect was told that the experimenter was interested in "why 
include, but not be limited to, the reasons P or effort ratings being what they were. The 
twice under each o r the simple failure conditions (simple failure, self-paced and simple 
h 
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Dependent measures were the same as for the first experiment: performance 
measures, errors, effort ratings, and other behavioral measures. 
RESULTS 
Statistical techniques used to analyze the data in Experiment Two were similar to 
those used in Experiment One. The effects of experimental conditions were evaluated 
with two-way analysis of variance with repeated measures. Factors in these analyses were 
Failure Complexity and Pacing. Relationships between measures were explored using time 
series analysis, in the same manner as descnbed for Experiment One. In the following 
presentation, effects noted in Experiment Two are reported first, followed by a 
comparison of the two experiments. 
Effects of Emerimental Conditions 
significantly affected by Pacing. First, the average level of in ut specified was higher in 
the self-paced condition than in the forced-paced condition P 117.17 vs. 104.32, F(1,3) = 
12.63, p = .038). Second, subjects kept more valves open in the self-paced condition than 
with forced-pacing (16.57 vs. 15.99, F( 1,3) = 79.07, p = ,003). 
average variance of tank levels. More trips occurred in the simple failure conditions than 
the complex failure conditions (238.62 vs. 151.50, F(1,3) = 2 6 . 8 1 , ~  = ,014). 
The Failure Complexity manipulation had significant effects upon command usage 
as well. (Command usage across experimental conditions is summarized in Figures 11 and 
12.) More "open" and "close" commands were issued in simple failure conditions (150.38 
Performance and other behavioral measures. Two performance measures were 
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Figure 11. Command usage across experimental conditions--Experiment Two. 
2 4  
1 
C o m m  a 11 d s 
i -t 
reprs 
f l o w s  
p i / p o  
op/c 1 
ss CS SF CF 
Exper imenta  1 Cond i t  i o n  
Figure 12. Percent of each type of command used across experimental 
conditions--Experiment Two. 
vs. 92.75 for com lex failures, F(1,3) = 2 2 . 3 1 , ~  = .OB). There were also more total 
difference in total commands can be largely attributed to the difference in open and close 
commands. 
commands issue B in simple failure runs (211.88 vs. 153.38, F(1,3) = 6 4 . 8 8 , ~  = .004). This 
As with the first experiment, subjects completed self-paced runs in less time than 
forced-paced runs (16.9 vs. 23.3 minutes, F(1,3) = 1 5 . 1 9 , ~  = .03). 
Error measures. Of the two experimental factors, only Failure Complexity had an 
effect upon errors. (See Fi res 13 and 14 for summaries of errors across experimental 
conditions.) In the simple i? ailure conditions, subjects made more CORSYN errors (4.25 
vs. 1.75 for corn lex failure conditions, F( 1,3) = 10.47, p = .048), more INAPP errors 
(7.50 vs. 4.88, Ff1,3) = 16.46, p = .027), and more total errors (21.12 vs. 13.13, F(1,3) = 
1 4 . 1 2 , ~  = .033). 
Effort ratings. In contrast to Experiment One, there were no differences in the 
number of ratin s obtained across experimental conditions. However, there was a small 
with self-pacing than with forced-pacing (4.015 vs. 4.560, F( 1,3) = 10.51, p = .048). 
RelationshiDs Between Measures 
analysis in the same manner as described for Experiment One. Full analyses were 
conducted for each of the 24 experimental production runs (4 subjects x 6 sessions), and 
then averaged correlation functions were created to facilitate interpretation. Those plots 
but significant e f fect of Pacing upon the magnitude of ratings. Effort ratings were lower 
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Figure 14. Percent of each type of error occurring across experimental 
conditions--Experiment Two. 
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of functions containing correlations greater than ~ 0 . 3  are shown in Figures 15 through 18. 
autocorrelations of production and number of open valves were found. As in Experiment 
One, these relationships were observed consistently in all 24 analyses. 
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Figure 16. Autocorrelation function for number of open valves--Experiment Two. 
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Positive autocorrelations of effort ratings were also noted. (See Figure 17.) Also 
consistent with the results of the first experiment, these relationships were found in 75% 
of the analyses. 
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Figure 17. Autocorrelation function for effort ratings--Experiment Two. 
Autocorrelations of errors were consistently low and non-significant. 
Cross-correlations. The strong positive relationship between number of open valves 
and subsequent production that was noted in the first experiment was replicated in 
Experiment Two. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 18. 
Negative cross-correlations between effort ratings and production were also found 
in 79% of the analyses. However, these relationships differed from those noted in 
Experiment One, in that changes in effort ratings preceded production changes in only 6 
of the cases; in 13 analyses, changes in production preceded changes in effort ratings. 
Negative cross-correlations were also noted in 79% of the analyses between effort 
ratings and number of open valves. As with the effort- roduction relationships, changes in 
preceded changes in production in 8 of the 19 cases in which the relationship was 
observed. 
one measure did not consistently precede changes in t K e other. Changes in effort 
Significant cross-correlations between effort ratings and errors were noted in only 6 
of the 24 analyses. 
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Figure 18. Cross-correlation for number of open valves x production--Experiment Two. 
Differences Between Experiments 
In order to make direct comparisons between the two experiments, all de endent 
measures were evaluated with analyses of variance in which Experiment was inc I!uded as a 
factor. More specifically, three-way analyses with repeated measures were performed 
using the factors of Experiment, Failure Complexity, and Pacing. Data from the 
incompatible conditions in the first experiment were excluded from this analysis. The 
Experiment factor was involved in the following significant effects. 
Performance and other behavioral measures. There was a si nificant interaction of 
Experiment and Failure Complexity in their effects on production &( 1,3) = 16.01, 
p = .028). In Experiment One, subjects produced signi icantly less in the complex failure 
condition (95,218 units) than in the simple failure condition (115,075 units). Production in 
both Failure Complexity conditions in Experiment Two was equal to the simple failure 
condition in Experiment One (117,192 units). 
The interaction of Experiment and Failure Complexity was also significant for 
valve trips (F( 1,3) = 12.63, p = .038). There was no significant difference in trips 
associated with Failure Complexity in Experiment One (146.13 vs. 124.38 for simple and 
complex failure conditions, respectively). However, there were significantly more trips in 
the simple failure condition (238.38) than in the complex failure condition (151.50) in 
Experiment Two. 
Regarding the number of open valves, the interaction of Experiment and Failure 
Complexity was once again significant. Subjects kept fewer valves open in the simple 
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failure condition in Experiment Two than in the other three combinations of Failure 
Complexity and Experiment (15.95 vs. a mean of 16.36, F(1,3) = 11.68 ,~  = .042). 
Subjects' choices of input level were also affected by the interaction of Experiment 
and Failure Complexity (F(1,3) = 15.58 ,~  = .029). In Experiment One, input was hi her 
in the simple failure condition than in the complex failure condition (105.29 vs. 94.53 5 . 
Avera e input in the two Failure Complexity conditions in Experiment Two did not differ 
from t e simple failure condition in Experim nt One (108.10 and 113.38 for the simple 
and complex failure conditions, respectively). 
higher in the simple failure condition (105.49) than in the complex failure condition 
(95.86) in E eriment One, but no differences were observed in Experiment Two (107.22 
vs. 119.00, F 7 1,3) = 12.89,~ = .037) 
upon the total number of commands issued (F( 1,3) = 14.12, p = .033). In Experiment 
One, there was no difference in total commands associated with Failure Complexity 
(170.04 vs. 150.75 for simple and complex failure conditions, respectively). In Experiment 
Two, however, more commands were issued in the simple failure condition (211.88) than 
in the complex failure condition (153.38). As noted in the presentation of results from 
Experiment Two, this difference appeared to be influenced largely by the number of 
"open valve" commands. 
measures (Le., UNCSYN, CORSYN, INAPP, OKCHNG, and MISTAKES) were 
observed. However, there was a significant interaction effect of Experiment and Failure 
Complexity u on total errors (F( 1,3) = 34.27, p = .010). Subjects made fewer errors in 
combinations of Experiment and Failure Complexity (21.44, 22.25, and 21.12). 
ratings. Effort ratings obtained in E eriment One were higher than those obtained in 
Experiment Two (5.36 vs. 4.29, F(1,3 7 = 55.57,~ = .005). 
f 'I 
Average output was affected in the same manner as input. Output was significantly 
There was a significant interaction effect of Experiment and Failure Complexity 
Error measures. No significant effects of Experiment upon the specific error 
the complex P ailure condition in Experiment Two (13.13) than with the other three 
Effort ratings. There was a significant main effect of Experiment upon effort 
Analvsis of Post-Session Interviews 
The recorded discussions with subjects were treated as data and analyzed as 
follows. First, plots of subjects' effort ratings over time were examined to identify points at 
which ratings had changed (Le., gone up or down one at least one point). Transcripts of 
the discussions were then reviewed to ascertain the reasons subjects had given for 
changing their ratings. Occasionally, there were multiple reasons for a particular change. 
In such a case, all reasons were noted. In a few cases (approximately 2%), subjects 
explained why their ratings had not been affected by situations that normally would have 
caused a chan e in rating. Reasons that a rating did not go down were recorded in the 
normal for a given situation were classified as "reasons for effort ratings going down." 
1. It may be recalled that the measures of production, trips, and input were not found to 
be significantly affected by Failure Complexity in the original analyses of data from 
Experiment One. A reexamination of that data indicates that there were differences for 
each of these measures consistent with the results reported here, but the differences failed 
to reach significance in Experiment One due to inter- and intra-subject variability. 
"reasons for e B fort ratings going up" category, and reasons that a rating stayed lower than 
.................... 
30 
A total of 354 reasons for changes in effort ratings were offered by subjects, which 
were classified into 15 categories by experimenter judgment. In an effort to avoid altering 
subjects’ meaning and forcing responses into categories that were inappropriate, most of 
the classification process was accomplished using the verbatim statements from subjects. 
Category labels were chosen as the last step. The resulting frequencies in each category 
are presented in Table 1. A brief explanation of each category listed in Table 1 is 
provided in Table 2. 
Table 1 
Reasons for Changes in Effort Ratings 




strange but manageable 
total acceptable situation 
Acceptable plan for recovery 
Acceptable explanation 
Miscellaneous 
TOTAL REASONS FOR RATINGS GOING DOWN 
REASONS FOR EFFORT RATINGS GOING UP 
Execution difficulties 
errors 
unacceptable system state 
total execution difficulties 
Inadequate explanation 
Operating on edge 
No acceptable plan for recovery 
goal conflict 
no plan 



























Elaboration of Reasons for changes in Effort Ratings 




unacceptable system state 
r 
Inadequate explanation 




strange but manageable 







The current situation is acceptable for one of the 
following reasons. 
There was a problem, but it is no longer present. 
The earlier perception of a problem was inaccurate. 
Although an acceptable explanation for current 
PLANT behavior is not available, the situation is 
controllable. 
Although the current situation is not acceptable, the 
course of action to be taken to rectify it is known. 
Events which were puzzling at first are now 
under st andable. 
~ 
There are problems in controlling PLANT for one of 
the following reasons. 
One or more earlier actions were inappropriate. 
Control of PLANT is difficult due to the current 
unstable PLANT state (as manifest by frequent valve 
trips). 
Some current events in PLANT are not understood. 
Although the current situation is acceptable, the 
situation would deteriorate rapidly if something went 
wrong. 
The current situation is unacceptable and there is no 
plan for recovery, due to one of the following reasons. 
More than one action is appropriate in the current 
situation, but only one action may be taken at a time. 
It is not clear what actions would be appropriate in 
the current situation. 
The current rating is high because the subjective 
impact of an earlier bad experience has not worn off. 
Development of the current unacceptable situation 
was not noticed. 
The reason does not fit into one of the above 




As with the discussion of the results of Experiment One, an attempt will be made 
here to summarize the results of Experiment Two in a coherent manner. Commonalties 
and differences in the two experiments will also be considered. Rather than discuss each 
statistically si nificant effect obtained, the approach will be to synthesize an overall 
Effects of Emerimental Conditions 
perspective o P how subjects responded. 
The effects of the experimental factors in Experiment Two may be summarized as 
follows. Regarding the effects of Pacing, forced-pacing resulted in lower input, fewer 
valves open, and higher effort ratings than did self-pacing. The Failure Complexity 
manipulation led to differences in trips and variance in tank levels. However, recall that 
performance was worse (i.e.,. there were more tri s and larger deviations in tank levels) 
significant interaction effects of the two factors. 
with the simpre failures condition. In contrast to F! xperiment One, there were no 
The reasons that the variables mentioned were affected by one experimental factor 
and not the other are not clear. Therefore, no attempt will be made here to distinguish 
the effects of Pacin and Failure Complexity. It is instructive, however, to look at the 
overall pattern of e i! fects obtained. 
number of open valves, and 6) variance in tank levels. Only two o P these were significantly 
Consider the six performance measures affected by the experimental manipulations 
in the two experiments: 1) production, 2) average output, 3) avera e input, 4) trips, 5 )  
affected by the manipulations in Experiment One: production and average output. In 
contrast, production and average output were not significantly affected in Experiment 
Two, but all of the others were. 
This pattern of results suggests the following interpretation. In both experiments, 
subjects were told that the primary goal of PLANT operation was to produce. Recall that 
the importance of this goal was emphasized with a production bonus in Experiment Two. 
It appears that the promise of a bonus led to a shift in focus across the two experiments. 
In Experiment One, subjects concentrated on maintaining a stable PLANT and 
responding to problems within the system. One way that they maintained stability was to 
scale back on output when it appeared that there might be problems. In Experiment Two, 
however, they "protected" roduction and did not use the strategy of reducing output to 
avoid problems. The signi P icant effects of the experimental manipulations upon the other 
performance measures reveal that, although production was maintained, stability was 
sacrificed. 
At first glance, it would appear that subjects made a tradeoff between production 
and stability, opting for stability in Experiment One and production in Experiment Two. It 
is important to note, however, that the dynamics of PLANT do not re uire such a tradeoff 
at the production levels achieved by sub'ects. The differences observe 1 reflected the 
subjects' choices of strategy rather than b LANT dynamics. 
This assertion is supported with a closer examination of the results. Subjects did 
not scale back on production in the complex failure condition in Experiment Two as they 
had in Experiment One; however, stability measures in the complex failure condition were 
not affected. Rather, system instability was greater in the simple failure condition in 
Experiment Two, with no corresponding increase in production. 
3 3  
An alternative interpretation is required. It is hypothesized that subjects 
interpreted the added emphasis on production as "permission" to allow more instability 
than they had in the ast. This could account for the sizable increase in trips in the simple 
Experiment One, however, they appeared to be more "careful" in problematic situations 
(i.e., the complex failure condition). Thus, they maintained system stability and committed 
fewer errors in the complex failure condition. 
discovery that effort ratings were lower in Experiment Two than in Experiment One. One 
interpretation is that the subjects were more experienced in Experiment Two and 
generally less affected by the problems of PLANT control. Further, the activities 
associated with participating in an experiment were no longer new to them, and they 
were, perhaps, more confident and less anxious to please the experimenter. 
Although this interpretation is certainly plausible and descriptive of subjects' 
apparent attitudes toward the experimental situation, the comments of subjects during the 
course of the experiment suggest that another less obvious "force" was operating as well. 
Consider again the interpretation that there was a shift in subjects' focus from stability to 
production across the two experiments, and the further possibility that subjects viewed 
system stability as less important in Experiment Two. Such a change in focus and attitude 
may have allowed the subjects to simplify the problem of PLANT control. 
deviations from the "desired tank level (which occur frequently in PLANT) are 
noteworthy events to be avoided for the sake of stability. If, on the other hand, the only 
important goal is production, instability is a problem only when it interferes with 
production. It is suggested that subjects adopted the latter position and experienced less 
effort as a result. This point is best illustrated by the comments of one subject as she 
observed a replay of one of her sessions during a post-session interview. "Just look at that 
system! It was in pretty bad shape then, but I didn't care. Look how much I was 
producing!" 
in isolation. They are still acce table when these effects are considered as a group, but 
the following effects: 
1. 
failure condition in 2 xperiment Two. Consistent with the earlier interpretation of 
Another effect of experimental conditions which must be addressed here is the 
If stability is an important goal independent of production, then valve trips or 
The explanations offered thus far appear plausible when the effects are considered 
none of the explanations is suf P icient to account for all of the results. Specifically, recall 
More production was achieved in the complex failure condition in Experiment Two 
than in Experiment One. 
Fewer errors were made in the complex failure condition in Experiment Two than 
in Experiment One. 
Effort ratings were lower in Experiment Two than in Experiment One, and there 
was no apparent increase associated with the complex failure condition. 
These results present a complex picture that is not readily understood. Providing 
an adequate explanation of what happened requires a great deal of extrapolation. The 
following discourse is offered as a hypothesis. 
production and less on tri s. The em hasis on production resulted in more production, 
2. 
3. 
As discussed earlier, subjects in Experiment Two appeared to focus more on 
and the lowered concern F or trips le B to more trips, fewer open valves, and (less directly) 
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. 
lower effort ratings. In the com lex failure condition, however, subjects were more 
that they ha B allowed so many trips in the simple failure condition, may have prompted 
subjects to "straighten up." This resulted in fewer errors in the complex failure condition. 
careful. The resence of a prob P em that was difficult to diagnose, and, perhaps, the fact 
The most puzzling aspect of these results is the lack of a relationship between 
errors and effort. If subjects were more careful in the complex failure condition, then why 
weren't effort ratinus higher in that condition? Recall that no relationship between these 
two measures was found in Experiment One either. 
effort ratings. As will be discussed later, execution difficulties were associated with only a 
third of the reasons offered by subjects; yet, most of the errors noted were errors of 
execution. If execution difficulties did not contribute to most of the increases in subjective 
effort, then it is not surprising that the two measures were not correlated. 
Relationships Between Measures 
An answer may be found by examining the reasons subjects gave for changes in 
Most of the relationships observed in Experiment Two were consistent with those 
in Experiment One. Autocorrelations and cross-correlations of production and number of 
open valves continued to illustrate the orderly dynamics of PLANT. Once again, no 
relationships involving errors were found. 
Three relationships require further discussion. First, as in Experiment One, 
si nificant autocorrelations of effort ratings were noted. It is curious that the proportion 
No explanation for this is offered; the coincidence is highlighted as a point of comparison 
for future research. 
o B production runs in which this relationship was observed was 75% in each experiment. 
The second noteworthy relationship is the autocorrelation of effort ratings and 
roduction. Recall that changes in effort ratings preceded changes in production in 
Experiment One, and that this relationship was interpreted as subjects' scaling back on 
production in response to increased mental effort. The relationship observed in 
Experiment Two was less consistent, with changes in effort foZZowing changes in 
production in 56% of the analyses, and preceding production changes in only 26% of the 
cases. This change in the effort- roduction relationship is further evidence of subjects' 
important, increased mental effort led to reduced production in the ho es of maintaining 
control. However, with production as the primary goal, changes in pro B uction led to 
changes in mental effort. 
change in focus in response to t K e production bonus. When PLANT stability was more 
The third relationship to be discussed is the autocorrelation of effort and number 
of open valves. In Experiment One, no clear relationship between these measures was 
observed. In Experiment Two, however, changes in the number of open valves preceded 
changes in effort in 48% of the analyses, and followed effort changes 35% of the time. No 
strong interpretation of this relationship is offered. It is merely cited as further suggesting 
that changing the emphasis on production led to the emergence of relationships involving 
secondary measures. 
Post-Session Interviews 
Looking at the subjects' explanations for changes in effort ratings summarized in 
Table 1, a number of observations may be made. The most noticeable characteristic of the 
data is the fact that there were more reasons for increases in effort ratings than there 
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were for decreases, both in fre uency and variety. At least two factors seemed to 
usually not abrupt; rather, rating magnitude ically increased gradually over time until 
reaching a peak. On the other hand, recovery ?) i.e., decrease in perceived effort) seemed 
to happen more quickly. Second, subjects usually began the session with an extremely low 
level of perceived effort, which was not reported again after problems had occurred. 
Consider now the reasons given for decreases in effort ratings. Not su risingly, by 
improved. The incidence of the other two explanations (having an acceptable explanation 
for the situation or an acceptable plan for recovery) is worth noting, however. According 
to a prescriptive view of problem solving in a variety of control situations, problem 
solution involves three stages: situation assessment, planning and commitment, and 
execution and monitoring. The third stage is completed when the problem is solved. 
Judging from Table 1, perceived effort often decreases upon completion of the third stage 
(i.e., the situation is again acceptable). These results indicate that a partial solution (Le., 
completion of one or two of the stages) can sometimes result in a reduction of perceived 
effort as well. 
contribute to the difference in 9 requency. First, large increases in perceived effort were 
far the most common explanation offered was that an unacceptable situation 'K ad 
The largest frequency of reasons given for increased effort ratings is in the category 
of ''execution difficulties." Due to the varied nature of responses in this category, the high 
frequency may be misleading. Two distinct types of response were classified as execution 
difficulty. The first, "errors," could be described as "chagrin" at having committed an error. 
Thus, in a sense, these responses could be considered a form of "psychological inertia" 
(which will be discussed in a moment). 
result of problems in controlling PLANT, usually due to valve trips. In the PLANT 
environment, valve trips can be problematic for two reasons: 1) they are annoying because 
the valves must be reopened, and 2) they may signify problems. The difference in 
interpretation is important, because the first is commonly associated with emergence from 
a problem state (Le., kee opening valves until stability is regained), whereas the second 
interpretations of valve trips from subjects' responses. 
"inadequate explanation." Higher ratings were frequently associated with confusion as to 
why events in PLANT were happenin . The third category in the list of reasons for rating 
production bonus. Subjects occasionally mentioned in Experiment Two that they felt they 
were pushing PLANT harder to achieve higher production. 
"No acceptable plan for recovery" was offered as an explanation for approximately 
10% of the increases in effort ratings. The low fre uency in this category relative to 
than inherent differences in the three stages of problem solving. In the PLANT 
environment, plans for recovery from most unacce table operational situations are 
which rocedure applies (Le., assessing the situation) and executing the appropriate 
proce B ure, with little need for generating plans. 
"Psychological inertia," for lack of a better term, refers to carryover effects from 
The second type of execution difficulty, "unacceptable system state," occurred as a 
signals the onset of a pro g lem. It is not possible to distinguish these alternative 
increases, "operating on edge," might a ave been cited less often if there had been no 
difficulties in explanation or execution probably re x ects PLANT characteristics rather 
provided in the form of procedures. Thus, much o P the subject's task involves identifying 
The single most frequent reason subjects gave for increased effort ratings was 
revious rating periods. In other words, subjects reported that some ratings were high 
[ecause they had not "settled down" from earlier experiences. Explanations in this 
3 6  
. 
category described two types of inertia: 1) persistence of erceived effort (continued high 
current situation reminded them of an earlier one). 
ratings after a situation had improved), and 2) renewal o P perceived effort (because the 
Occasionally, subjects reported that subjective effort increased as a result of 
"surprise." Subjects' ratings suggest that the effects of surprise, though infrequent, can be 
quite potent. The most marked increases in ratings (e.g., jumpin from a "2" to a "10') 
a surprise event. 
A great deal of interpretation is not required to synthesize the results presented in 
Table 1 into a transition diagram such as the one in Figure 19. The predominant force 
affecting increases in effort ratings in the PLANT environment is the transition from an 
acceptable to an unacceptable situation. This is illustrated by the large arrow in the center 
of the figure. The other arrows provide more explicit re resentations of the reasons 
arrows represent reasons for effort ratings going down. 
were associated with surprise, and at least two reports of psycho B ogical inertia referred to 
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The results of the two experiments reported here suggest a few general comments. 
First, the comprehensive approach to data analysis made it possible to identify a number 
of interesting patterns in the data which would have gone unnoticed if analysis had been 
confined to performance measures. In articular, the use of time series analysis to 
a roach. Since it is reasonable to expect that cause-and-effect relationships involving 
analysis is appealing. 
examine time-varying characteristics o P subjective effort and performance is a promising 
e FP ort may not be contemporaneous, the capability to incorporate time lags into the 
session was also very use K 1, and appears to have been a good compromise between on- The technique em loyed for eliciting subjects' thoughts over the course of the 
line generation of verbal protocols and post-event interviews. Ratings of effort were 
requested on line to obtain as accurate a representation as possible. In-depth exploration 
of the events that contributed to the effort ratings was possible in the subsequent 
interviews without interfering with subjects' control behavior. Replaying the session for 
the subjects allowed them to reconstruct the production run (apparently with little 
difficulty), and the ratings jogged their memories and helped them to recall the timing of 
events. 
Consider now the failure to find a relationship between subjective effort and error. 
The PLANT environment allows substantial operator discretion and is largely forgiving of 
slips. Tolerance of slips arises from the "slip-tolerant" nature of the interface and the 
ossibility of correcting many erroneous actions before the consequences of such actions 
[ecome severe. The results of this research suggest that perceived effort is not reliably 
related to slips in such environments. This is worth noting because operator discretion and 
self-correction is possible in many of the operational enwronments in existence. 
It is possible, however, that perceived effort in these environments could be related 
to mistakes. If we consider the reasons subjects gave for increases in effort ratings, many 
of them could be associated with some cognitive activity (such as figuring out what was 
happening or trying to develop a plan). Mistakes occurred if the products of such 
cognitive activity were inappropriate intentions. In fact, in other work (van Eekhout & 
Rouse, 1981; Johnson & Rouse, 1982) the mere fact that a subject did not understand 
what was happening was considered to be an error. 
the data obtained in this research, but it is not difficult to imagine an association between 
mistakes and effort. Two alternatives are feasible given the data available. First, effort 
may increase in anticipation of a situation in which a mistake is likely. Second, effort may 
increase as a result of having to deal with the consequences of the mistake. It is not 
possible to determine which occurred most often here, but the alternatives could be 
evaluated with the time-series methodology if appropriate data were available. 
Information about the occurrence of mistakes could not be extracted easily from 
Considering the overall results of these two experiments, they provide a 
demonstration of the adaptability of the human operator. Adaptation to three different 
factors is tenable in light of these results: 1) likelihood of error, 2) perceived effort, and 3) 
reward contingencies. This might be viewed as a failure of the experimental paradigm to 
control for unwanted subject variation, thereby preventing the identification of the "true" 
relationships between the experimental factors. 
. 
It is argued, however, that subjects' behavior in these experiments did reflect the 
way the operator of an actual system might behave. In many situations, adaptation on the 
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part of the operator is possible; in fact, the human element persists in some systems 
{e impossible to understand operator behavior in less constrained situations if the 
possibility of adaptive behavior is not taken into consideration. 
recisely because of its adaptive capabilities. As seen in the results reported here, it may 
The observation that humans adapt to reward contingencies is not particularly 
novel, and does not merit further discussion here. It is worthwhile, however, to consider 
the other forms of adaptation noted. Two general "principles" are offered. 
First, as suggested by the results of Experiment One and, to a lesser extent, 
Experiment Two, people encounterin a situation in which errors appear likely respond to 
the situation or controllin themselves (e.g., they are more careful or they change 
some reason. One possibility, which underlies much of the analysis in the conce tual 
framework, is that people do not perceive the need to adapt until errors have a P ready 
occurred. In the present research, this does not seem to have been the case. 
Second, when experiencing an increase in perceived effort above some "acceptable" 
threshold, people attempt to reduce the level of perceived effort. The options of 
controlling the situation or controlling themselves once again apply. This interpretation is 
consistent with common reports of human "economizing" in decision making. 
that situation by trying to reduce the P ikelihood of error. They do this by either controlling 
strategies). Errors result i f people are placed in situations to which they cannot adapt for 
The im lications of these results are interesting. For example, the roblems 
this paper, are underscored. In light of humans' adaptive tendencies, the conce t of 
human error rate seems rather ephemeral. Thus, rather than questioning the li E elihood of 
error in a statistical sense, a more important issue to be addressed is the identification of 
factors which limit humans' ability to adapt a situation to themselves or vice versa. 
Also at issue is the generalizability of results obtained in constrained situations to 
situations in which more discretion is possible. If research is to provide understanding of 
human behavior in less constrained environments, then discretion must be ossible in the 
experimental paradigms used. Placing constraints on the environment for t K e sake of 
experimental tractability may be necessary, but it must be done with great care. Human 
adaptation is the norm rather than the exception. Since it ap ears that adaptation is likely, 
effort should be devoted to identifying the precipitating con B itions and ways in which a 
human operator is likely to adapt. 
associated wit K attempting to identify human error rates, as discussed in t f: e beginning of 
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